We present a novel analysis extending the recent work of Mizuno et al. (Physica A 308 (2002) 411) on the hyperin ations of Germany (1920/1/1-1923/11/1), Hungary (1945/4/30 -1946/7/15), Brazil (1969 -1994, Israel (1969Israel ( -1985, Nicaragua (1969Nicaragua ( -1991, Peru (1969Peru ( -1990 and Bolivia (1969Bolivia ( -1985. On the basis of a generalization of Cagan's model of in ation based on the mechanism of "in ationary expectation" of positive feedbacks between realized growth rate and people's expected growth rate, we ÿnd that hyperin ations can be characterized by a power law singularity culminating at a critical time tc. Mizuno et al.'s double-exponential function can be seen as a discrete time-step approximation of our more general non-linear ODE formulation of the price dynamics which exhibits a ÿnite-time singular behavior. This extension of Cagan's model, which makes natural the appearance of a critical time tc, has the advantage of providing a well-deÿned end of the clearly unsustainable hyperin ation regime. We ÿnd an excellent and reliable agreement between theory and data for Germany, Hungary, Peru and Bolivia. For Brazil, Israel and Nicaragua, the super-exponential growth seems to be already contaminated signiÿcantly by the existence of a cross-over to a stationary regime.
Introduction
In ation is the economic situation in which prices apparently move monotonically upward and the value of money decreases. To classical economics, in ation is the undue increase in the supply of credit above the level that is supported by current savings. High in ation is always associated with high rates of money supply growth while the relationship is weak for countries with low in ation [1] . Thus, ÿghting high in ation requires reducing the growth rate of the money supply.
In ation is one of the few big issues in macroeconomics, together with unemployment, monetary policy, ÿscal policy, import-export deÿcits, productivity, government spending and the business cycle, and has been at the forefront of public battles over the past half-century. A good economic policy should strive to achieve a balance between often contradictory requirements: for instance, many economists assume that unemployment tends toward a natural rate below which it cannot go without creating in ation. Samuelson and Solow had brought to the US the empirical evidence, ÿrst compiled by the British economist A.W. Phillips, that there seems to be a tradeo between in ation and unemployment-that is, higher in ation meant lower unemployment. There is thus a long tradition among economists to adopt monetary policy as a way to keep the economy running on high-employment overdrive. Allowing prices to rise seemed the only humane thing to do. Friedman argued however that the unemployment/in ation tradeo was temporary, and he also pointed out that using ÿscal and monetary policy to avert recessions was a lot harder than it looked. The di culties stem from the fact that policies designed to restrain in ation by lowering the level of aggregate demand will tend to depress investment and harm capacity. Improved industrial performance requires a climate conducive to investment and research and development, which in turn depends on, inter alia, high and stable levels of aggregate demand. Business and in ation cycles often result from the combination of endogenous interactions (that can lead to incoherence) and of the e ects of institutions to contain these tendencies in the economy. The corresponding economic times serie can exhibit smooth growth and well-behaved cycles as possible transitory results of the economic processes, but can also allow for intermittent conditions conducive to the emergence of incoherence or turbulence. Institutional factors attempt to act as circuit breakers on the economy. Whenever institutionally determined values dominate endogenously determined values, the path of the economy is broken and an interactive process, which starts with new initial conditions, generates future values. Speciÿcally, whenever the economy threatens to behave incoherently, these stabilizers, whether built-in or activated by government authority, prevent the economy from continuing on the prior determined path, with the corresponding added complication and possible elements of destabilization. These are important elements in the path evolution of in ation.
In standard economic theory, in ation is associated with money supply growth. At equilibrium, money determines price level and implies equilibrium in markets for other assets. At equilibrium, money demand depends primarily on income and interest rates. But there are several factors keeping money demand unstable, such as ÿnancial innovations as well expectations. Indeed, one of the major causes of the complexity in stabilizing in ation together with other macroeconomic variables is that expectations
